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ABSTRACT 
We consider the vertical access model of the rail passenger sector in Russia and formally 
analyse the attractiveness of complete vertical divestiture as an option for the future reform 
steps. The integrated infrastructure company (RZD) serves also the passenger market and is 
engaged in sabotage in order to disadvantage existing or potential rivals of its downstream 
affiliate – Federal Passenger Directorate. We found that the welfare gain from the vertical 
divestiture may depend on the nature and toughness of downstream competition and be 
irrelevant to the size of scope economies and maximum level of sabotage. 
 
JEL classifications: L51, L22  
 
Key words: downstream competition, constrained capacity, sabotage 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The pros and cons of vertical integration of infrastructure and operations in the railroad 
industry has traditionally nourished the reform agenda and very often polarized the political 
debate on the merits of vertical divestiture. The arguments in favor of importance and 
desirability of vertical integration in the network industries range from the better operational 
coordination and economies from sharing common costs to technological and productive 
efficiency and incentives to innovate2. Disadvantages of vertical integration are also well 
known: hierarchies tend to monopolise certain markets and are reputed to response slowly to 
demand shocks. Moreover, their regulation becomes more complicated and requires more 
resources. The last argument is especially pronounced when the downstream market (train 
operations) is open for competition: the infrastructure owner who also provides end-user 
services may have means and incentives to discriminate its non-integrated downstream rivals. 
In such a vertical access model the problem of making on-track competition viable becomes 
comparatively more regulatory intensive. In transition economies the institutional weakness 
and insufficient competence of regulatory and antimonopoly authorities make them 
supportive of vertical separation3 while railway monopoly managers and industry specialists 
                                                 
1 This draft has been prepared for the Thredbo10 Conference on ‘Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport’, Hamilton 
Island, Australia, August 2007. The author wishes to thank Bruno de Borger, Javier Campos and Russell Pittman for useful comments and 
suggestions on the earlier version of this paper, and Denis Khakimov for brilliant research assistance. Usual disclaimer applies. 
2 See the Seabright (2003), Ksoll (2004) and Pittman (2005) for the detailed analysis of such arguments with application to railway 
transport. 
3 See Pittman (2003a, 2003b). 
often advocate the opposite solution for the railroad industry. The ongoing debate on the 
railway reform in Russia perfectly illustrates such a contradiction. 
 
Adopted in 2001 the three-stage reform program lacked the detailed description of target 
industry structure by the end of the process in 2010. Nevertheless the program called for the 
vertical access model at least at the intermediate stage of reform. This sort of incremental 
approach to industry transformation compromised to some extent the two polar approaches 
and made the long-expected structural reorganization possible4. The second stage of reform 
started in 2003 with the establishment of the Russian Railways Joint Stock Company (RZD) 
wholly owned by the Government. Competition in the marker for wagon provision in the 
freight sector was legalized5 by the adoption of the new freight tariff system in 2003 (so 
called Price Courant #10-01 introduced a discount from differentiated transportation tariffs for 
operators using their own or leased wagons). The adoption of ‘Rules on the provision of non-
discriminatory access to infrastructure’ in 2003 equipped the antimonopoly authority with a 
necessary instrument to secure equal treatment for all carriers and operators.  
 
These and other measures of regulatory reform opened the room for on-track competition. Not 
surprisingly, it emerged firstly in the most lucrative markets (eg. transportation of oil and high 
value-added commodities).  The industry structure changed and the financial stability of the 
RZD challenged. Dementiev (2007) argues that if the vertically integrated company, like 
RZD, is closely regulated on the downstream market which is open for competition, such a 
company would implement a set of ‘defensive’ strategies to deal with competition from the 
private sector. These competitive strategies would include (but not be limited to) different 
methods of rivals discrimination and/or self-restructuring. Indeed the next step of reform in 
2007 was the establishment of the First Freight Company (FFC) as an operator of rolling 
stock wholly-owned by RZD. The First Freight Company received about 200,000 mostly 
specialized freight wagons (out of 520,000 owned by RZD). The main idea was to escape from 
tariff regulation and concentrate the business activity on the niche markets which turned out 
to be financially more attractive but to large extent ‘cream-skimmed’ by independent 
operators. It is envisaged that in the mid-term one of the biggest freight company in the world, 
as the FFC proved to be with the assessed capitalization of $5bln, will be partially privatized 
through IPO. 
 
Accomplishments in the passenger sector are less impressive and maybe characterized as 
‘pending departure’. The new tariff system (known as Price Courant #10-02-16) has been 
drafted but never officially adopted. It has been designed to distinguish between 4 types of 
charges – for the use of railway infrastructure, stations, locomotives and wagons – and aimed 
at encouraging investments in passenger rolling stock (wagons and, possibly, locomotives). 
Instead, the passenger ticket fare has been consisting of the two components – the ‘platzkarte’ 
(charge for the seat) and ‘billett’(charge for the transportation) – with no clear reference to 
any type of costs covered by each of these components. Interestingly, the lack of transparent 
rules for access to RZD infrastructure and corresponding tariffs (which would private 
operators wish to pay for the use of RZD’s infrastructure, locomotives and stations) didn’t 
prevent private passenger companies from starting their operations on some routes. This 
phenomenon is the major concern and motivation of this paper. 
 
                                                 
4 OECD (2004) and OECD (2007 update) report the details and progress of the reform. 
5 The rush to adopt the structural reform plan in 2001 and elaborate the new Price Courant #10-01 in 2003 was explained by the need to 
deal with rolling stock shortage in the freight sector on the wave of economic upheaval in Russia. On the eve of reform approximately one 
forth of the car fleet was private. However the incentives to modernize existing and invest in new wagons were absent because private 
wagon owners had to pay the same tariff for transportation as those shippers who used RZD wagons. The new tariff system legalized 
previously informal discounts from transportation tariff  for the private wagon owners. 
To sum up, during the first 6 years of reform the railroad industry in Russia evolved from the 
monolithic state ministry to the following structure: vertically integrated state-owned 
infrastructure company – RZD – being the only licensed carrier on its network, its affiliates 
serving as specialized freight operators (FFC, TransContainer, RailTransAuto, RefService), 
Federal Passenger Directorate6, 10 suburban and regional passenger companies and about 
2500 private operators with their own wagon fleet. Among them there are two fully private 
intercity passenger companies – Grand Express and Megapolis – both operating on Moscow-
St. Petersburg route and competing in both middle and luxury price segments with RZD 
trains. The very emergence of on-track competition in the passenger sector at this stage of 
reform and possible RZD’s strategic actions (like transformation of the Federal Passenger 
Directorate to a more institutionally independent Federal Passenger Company – FPK) as a 
next step of reform deserves theoretical and empirical investigation. In this paper we 
attempted this kind of research at two levels. 
 
At the theoretical level this paper develops an analytical framework that enables one to grasp 
the complex system of different arguments in favor of and against the complete divestiture of 
the vertically integrated provider (VIP) of essential facility (access to infrastructure) that faces 
competition downstream. We endow the VIP with an ability to discriminate (or sabotage) its’ 
rivals by raising their costs. In the formal model we analyze discriminatory activities of the 
VIP under different institutional settings and consider welfare implications under different 
assumptions about the toughness of downstream competition in the rail passenger market to 
answer the question when the vertical divestiture may be welfare improving. We found that 
the welfare gain from the vertical divestiture may depend on the type of regulation applied to 
the vertically-integrated railway monopolist (RZD) and be conditioned by the nature and 
toughness of downstream competition. These findings shed some light on the optimal path for 
the passenger railway transport reform in Russia. 
 
The paper also addresses the problem of vertical divestiture at the empirical level providing 
some evidence to support basic assumptions made in the theoretical model. Thus the purpose 
of this research is to assess the prospects of competition in the passenger sector and formulate 
some policy recommendations concerning the reform measures to be taken in the future. 
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the existing literature 
relevant for the formal analysis of the vertical access model to do welfare comparisons of 
alternative industry structures. Section 3 analyzes the institutional environment (formal and 
informal) of the passenger railway transport reform in Russia and defines four principle 
regulatory schemes at the different stages of reform: preparatory, vertical access with 
downstream regulation, vertical access with unregulated downstream market and possible 
future configuration – complete vertical divestiture of the VIP. A simple theoretical 
framework inspired by Sappington (2006a) is built in Section 4. We depart from the original 
setup in our treatment of the nature of downstream competition. The main findings are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
The railroad industry in Russia is characterised by the situation when infrastructure monopoly 
both serves the end-user (downstream) market and provides the essential facility to its 
downstream competitors. Such a vertical access model has attracted considerable attention of 
                                                 
6 The term ‘directorate’ (or ‘branch’) stands for the separate division within RZD structure with virtually no business autonomy. Under such 
an institutional arrangement even accounting separation is in doubt since the officially reported financial results of the Directorate may be 
misleading because the methodology of splitting the shared costs between freight and passenger services has always been questionable. 
economists, industry specialists and policymakers. Intuitively, vertically integrated service 
provider (VIP) may benefit from discriminating against non-integrated downstream rivals and 
thereby hinder industry performance. To level the playing field at the potentially competitive 
downstream market policymakers often adhere to the vertical separation approach so as to 
prevent the infrastructure owner from sabotage (or treating different operators in a different 
way).  
 
However since it is not uncommon for the railway industries to exhibit substantial economies 
of scope, such a vertical unbundling strategy may increase the costs of service at each stage of 
production and decrease total welfare. Traditionally, the trade-off between economies of 
vertical integration and welfare gains from tougher downstream competition has been treated 
as a country-specific question to be studied empirically. In our paper we try to follow the 
recent research agenda to incorporate sabotage as a strategic variable in the model of 
competition in the vertically related market. 
 
The economic literature on sabotage distinguishes between cost-raising (see Beard at al., 
2001) and demand reducing types of such a discriminatory activity (Mandy and Sappington, 
2007). It is generally acknowledged that if raising the costs of downstream rivals is costless 
sabotage makes sense for the VIP (Sappington, 2006b). In Cournot settings (e.g., 
Economides, 1998; Sibley and Weisman, 1998) when downstream firms compete in 
quantities, as well as in case of competition in prices a la Bertrand (e.g., Weisman, 1995; 
Beard et al., 2001; Kondaurova and Weisman, 2003) cost-raising sabotage by the VIP brings 
about an increase in the profit of its downstream affiliate. This type of sabotage induces 
downstream competitors to produce less that would lead to a decrease in the demand for the 
final product. In turn the upstream profit decreases if there is some mark-up over marginal 
cost on the upstream market ((e.g., Weisman, 1995; Sibley and Weisman, 1998). Thus, the 
potential trade-of between downstream gains (measured by the consumers’ surplus) and losses 
from the diseconomies of scope (or vertical integration) worth considering. 
 
This approach may be directly applied to the analysis of pros and cons of vertical divestiture 
of the VIP that faces downstream competition and the answer may depend on the assumptions 
about its nature and fierceness. Crew et al. (2005) investigate the Cournot competition and 
argue that vertical divestiture can eliminate sabotage at the expense of scope economies gain. 
The policymakers must evaluate the potential for sabotage vs. scope economies (embodied in 
smaller costs of the downstream production of the VIP affiliate). If the former exceeds the 
latter vertical separation is preferred, otherwise integrated production is to be chosen. If the 
downstream firms engage in Bertrand competition (see Sappington, 2006a) this result doesn’t 
hold anymore: even when scope economies are high and potential for sabotage is limited the 
vertical separation secures higher level of expected consumers’ surplus comparing to vertical 
integration. 
 
Adopting similar approach we contribute to this literature in the following. We assume that 
downstream competitors (the VIP affiliate, operating rival and any potential entrant) have pre-
commitments about their production potentials and compete in prices. So their capacities 
turned out to be constrained and constant in the short-run. We also assume that any two rivals 
can capture the whole downstream market but none of them have enough facilities to drive its 
rival out the market completely. This assumption appears to be crucial to our findings but 
doesn’t seem implausible if we want to analyze discrete structures of the industry or further 
reform measures. The following section provides some rationale behind this and other 
assumptions of the model. 
 
STYLIZED FACTS OF THE REFORM 
To substantiate our formal analysis we start with reporting some important stylized facts 
about the regulatory framework and market conditions at different stages of railway reform in 
Russia. We focus on the intercity rail passenger services.  
 
It is the regulatory policy together with demand shocks, rolling stock depletion, the lack of 
adequate financing and consequent underinvestment in quality of service and other reason that 
influenced the emergence of competition in the market for intercity passenger services. 
Originally, competition took the form of open tenders for outsourcing activities taken by 
private companies for RZD and were limited to catering, laundering, etc. As these companies 
matured and got necessary experience and qualification they started to operate passenger 
trains (with private wagon or wagons leased from RZD) under their own brand names. 
Obviously, they entered probably the most attractive market for intercity passenger services in 
Russia, the Moscow – St. Petersburg ‘golden route’, with a hope that future financial gains 
would eventually outweigh the costs of all the entry barriers and other difficulties resulted 
from (potential) RZD’s discriminatory activities.  
 
The entry decision was also based on the assessment of regulatory environment in the 
industry. The Figure 1 below demonstrates that regulatory policy happened to be quite 
favourable for the rail passenger market since real passenger tariffs (average 2nd class 
passenger ticker fare compared to CPI) substantially increased during the reform period and 
become more flexible and seasonally adjusted. These changes in tariff dynamics reflect the 
fact that 2nd and higher class ticket fares were effectively unregulated in 2003. 
 
Changes in average relative prices for the one-way ticket by train 
in 1995-2006
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Figure 1:  Relative price indices in 1995 - 2006 
 
Several features of the market structure (in particular the degree of vertical separation), extent 
of competition and regulatory policy are crucial for further analysis. In terms of these three 
major dimensions of the structural reform in Russia7 the rail passenger transport reform may 
be described by four principal structural schemes. 
 
The industry structure at the first stage of reform (the preparatory phase), which we will call 
Scheme #1, was characterized by the model of vertical integration with downstream tariff 
regulation and virtually no way to have access to infrastructure by independent operator. 
 
Scheme #2 stands for the vertical access model when VIP affiliate is strictly regulated but its 
competitive fringe is unregulated. This structural scheme may deserve special research efforts 
but such an ‘overregulated’ vertical access model has never experienced any competitive 
pressure from independent train operators in Russian passenger market. It’s worth mentioning 
here that being free to choose the market segments to enter independent passenger train 
operators would consider first of all the most lucrative markets. Among them the rail link 
between the two capitals – Moscow and St. Petersburg – appears to be the most promising 
one. The market however did remain closed for competition until tariffs were unregulated. 
The fares for 2nd, 1st, de luxe classes of passenger services were formally unregulated in 
2003 while the first license for the private train was issued in November 2002 (Grand Express 
became the first private passenger train to target VIP travellers). 
 
Scheme #3 (vertical access model with downstream deregulation) reflects the position of RZD 
managers and some advisors (OECD, 2007update) to retain Federal Passenger Directorate in 
its current status as a structural division of RZD company with very rough accounting 
separation. 
 
An important point is that entry decision was preconditioned by the lack and bad quality of 
RZD’s wagon fleet available on the particular route. Thus in an attempt to capture the basic 
features of that stage of reform in Russia we incorporated some exogenously given capacity 
constraints exhibited by both RZD downstream affiliate and its rival(s). The presence of at 
least two competing operators on the particular route has always been viewed by the 
antimonopoly authorities in Russia as a desirable outcome of the structural reform. At the 
same time RZD also claimed that the very presence of competing operator companies must 
weaken if not eliminate the regulatory pressure imposed on the RZD company. As RZD’s 
CEO argued (Yakunin, 2007): 
 
RZD has three strategic goals for this period. Firstly, we will develop a 
competitive market for transport services in co-operation with the Ministry of 
Transport. Secondly, we will work to increase the overall competitiveness of 
RZD, which means becoming much more efficient. And thirdly, RZD must 
increase its capitalisation while remaining under close government control. 
 
Admitting the importance of intercity rail passenger service in Russia the ECMT/OECD team 
concluded their recent study of the reform progress in Russia with the following advice 
(OECD (2007 update), p. 24): 
Experience with Amtrak and VIA in North America has shown that the fully 
separated approach … has led to exactly the kinds of problems of inadequate  
financing, difficulty in track capacity management, poor on-time performance and 
unending political interference that RZD has highlighted as disadvantages of 
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separation for the passenger railway. RZD’s plans for developing a separated 
company or companies should take these problems into account and, at least in the 
near term, it may well make sense to establish the passenger company as an RZD 
subsidiary. 
 
Scheme #4 (complete vertical separation with access charge set above marginal costs) means 
privatization of the Federal Passenger Company (FPK) making it structurally separate and 
institutionally independent company. Fairly curiously, the establishment of FPK as a 100% 
subsidiary of RZD is primarily viewed in Russia (by both the reformers and RZD managers) 
as a measure to speed up the process of accounting separation rather that the move to deeper 
disintegration between the infrastructure and passenger services. 
 
In the following sections we compare the Scheme #3 and Scheme #4 to make judgments 
about their relative attractiveness primarily from the consumer’s point of view. Before we 
proceed our formal analysis let us have a closer look at the market segment we are going to 
model. 
 
The second private passenger train in Russia started its operation in 2006 on the very same 
route (Moscow-St. Petersburg) as the first one (Grand Express) but chose different segment, 
primarily 2nd class travellers (see the Figure 2 below).  
 
 
Figure 2:  The size and structure of the market for intercity rail passenger service  
on the ‘golden route’ between Moscow and St. Petersburg 
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The departure time of Megapolis train (00:45) is probably least comfortable among other 
night trains with 2nd class compartments. Its occupancy ratio is lower than that of RZD night 
trains. Thus the assumption that passengers first look for the tickets on RZD trains seems to 
be plausible. 
 
THE MODEL 
The final service (2nd class passenger transportation by rail) is a homogenous good that can 
be supplied either by the vertically integrated incumbent or by its downstream competitors. 
Incumbent network owner provides access services that are required to produce final one. 
Entrants (or downstream competitors) supply a final service (operate wagons and charge their 
customers) in competition with the incumbent and use the single unit of the access service to 
the incumbent’s network as an input (essential facility).  
 
The upstream market size is normalized to unity. Such an assumption helps us to avoid 
useless calculations though allows us only to make judgments in (comparative) static terms. 
Nevertheless, when dealing with discrete organizational changes (as in case of structural 
reform) this approach proves to be fruitful. The demand for final service is completely 
inelastic in the short-run. There exists some finite price v  that correspond to maximum 
willingness to pay (the best alternative way to move between the two capitals is by plane). 
 
There are no entry barriers for the downstream market. The crucial assumption to our results 
is the inability by any single operator to serve all the downstream market because of its 
limited capacity. At the same time any two operators (incumbent’s downstream affiliate, most 
efficient competitor and second-highest cost rival) have enough potential to supply all the 
market. The other possible rationale for this assumption may be the Government’s structural 
reform measure to split the downstream capacity (wagons in our case) between the two or 
more operators and privatize them. So customers choose the operating company with lowest 
price until the latter fully utilizes all its capacity and then switch to the other one. More 
efficient competitors can completely displace the incumbent’s final service only together. To 
make the model tractable we also have to assume that if several firms charge the same price 
for the final service, all customers prefer to purchase from the vertically integrated 
infrastructure owner (VIP).  
 
The VIP can commit some sabotage s  that raises his rivals’ costs symmetrically by exactly 
this amount s . This type of discrimination is assumed to be costless for the VIP but having 
the upper bound s . Thus the incumbent’s discriminatory activity is limited (for instance by 
the counteraction of antimonopoly authority). Non-integrated rivals, on the contrary, can not 
exercise any level of sabotage. 
 
The incumbent’s unit cost of producing the final service is known and equal to 
I
Dc . Its 
upstream unit cost is constant and equal to uc . When the VIP supplies the downstream 
market, it incurs the sum of these costs less e  which reflects his economies of scope (or 
economies of vertical integration). Thus under vertical access model the VIP’s unit cost is 
ecc IDu −+  comparing to IDu cc +  under vertical separation. 
 
The VIP’s downstream capacity is limited by [ ]1 ,0∈α  the maximum share of the market 
which is assumed to be exogenous (when 1=α , all the market is served by the incumbent). 
The rest of the market can be captured by one or another rival operator. Each rival has limited 
capacity equal to )1( α− . They can not sell it to each other or buy from the incumbent’s 
downstream division. The entry turns out to be profitable if there is downstream production 
cost efficiency. But neither the most efficient competitor nor the incumbent can serve the 
downstream market alone. 
 
Since the access to infrastructure is essential facility and can not be bypassed it is subject to 
regulation. Both Schemes #3 and #4 imply that access to infrastructure is charged by the 
regulator at the level uca > . 
 
There are two downstream operators with marginal costs RDc  and Δ+RDc  ( 0≥Δ ). The smaller 
is Δ  the greater is the toughness of competition. RDc  is unknown to the regulator but has 
density function )( RDcf  with strictly positive support on ] ,[ cc  and cumulative distribution 
function )( RDcF . Such an assumption reflects the idea that regulator usually makes decisions 
(chooses the future industry structure) before the entry occurs. 
 
DISCUSSION 
To make an assessment of relative attractiveness of different structural schemes we have to 
consider first whether each scheme is prone to sabotage or not. 
 
Lemma 1 
The VIP will exercise the maximum level of sabotage s  under vertical access model without 
downstream regulation (Scheme #3)8. 
 
This result reproduces those of Sappington (2006a) derived for the Bertrand competition with 
no capacity constraints. The following Lemma 2 uses this finding by taking into account that 
strategic variable s  enters the expressions for equilibrium price levels at its upper bound s . 
 
Lemma 2 
Under vertical access model with constrained capacities on the unregulated downstream 
market (Scheme #3) the Bertrand competition results in the equilibrium price being equal to 
the marginal costs of that player who has not entered the market:  
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where )(ˆ u
I
D caescc −−−−=  
                                                 
8 The proof for this and other lemmas and propositions is provided in the Appendix. 
The equilibrium price is unique because the market is contested by the threat of entry. Since 
we assumed limited capacities this price would be higher comparing to pure Bertrand case 
with no restrictions from the supply side. Intuitively, since the market can not be served by 
the most efficient competitor alone, the second efficient one enters the market bidding 
equilibrium price up. 
Lemma 3. 
The VIP will refrain from sabotage under vertical separation model (Scheme #4). 
 
Lemma 4. 
Under vertical separation model with constrained capacities on the unregulated downstream 
market (Scheme #4) the Bertrand competition results in the equilibrium price being equal to 
the marginal costs of the potential entrant who contests the downstream market: 
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Note that for each possible realisation of the rival’s costs RDc  neither scope economies nor 
sabotage parameters influence the equilibrium prices under vertical separation. 
Having derived equilibrium prices for different structural schemes we now turn to the direct 
comparisons of the welfare effects of the reform. It is measured as the difference between the 
two consumers’ surpluses realized under the corresponding stages of the reform. We begin 
with an assessment of relative attractiveness of complete vertical separation in comparison 
with vertical access model with no downstream regulation. Specifically, we estimate the 
incremental expected consumer’s surplus defined as 3434 IS ECSECSD −=− , where 4SECS  and 
3
IECS  are expected consumer’s surpluses under vertical separation and vertical access models 
respectively. 
Proposition 1 
The incremental expected consumer’s surplus under vertical separation vs. 
vertical access with no downstream regulation (Scheme #4 vs. Scheme #3) 
decreases as the costs of the downstream rivals become more similar, i.e. 
034 >Δ
−
d
dD  
This proposition tells us that if inter-rival competition is sufficiently intense (relative 
proximity of the rivals’ costs becomes more pronounced and 0→Δ ) the consumer’s gain 
from complete vertical divestiture of the VIP decreases. It means that vertical access model 
remains relatively more attractive comparing to vertical separation model when downstream 
market becomes more contestable. This result contradicts to those of Sappington (2006a) 
derived under the standard assumption of Bertrand competition with no capacity constraints. 
Possible policy implications are discussed in the concluding section. 
Proposition 2 
The incremental expected consumer’s surplus under vertical separation relative to 
vertical access model without regulation (Scheme #4 vs. Scheme #3) decreases as 
the level of sabotage engaged by the VIP decreases (expected consumer’s surplus 
under integration increases), i.e. 034 >−
sd
dD . 
 
The natural interpretation of this proposition is the following. When regulator effectively 
controls the VIP’s ability to exercise sabotage consumer’s expected gain from the vertical 
separation will be less pronounced. 
 
The following Figures 3 and 4 illustrate these findings and help to better understand the 
conclusions derived from Lemmas 2 and 4. The solid line demonstrates the equilibrium 
market price under vertical separation, while dotted line corresponds to vertical access model. 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium price levels as a function of rival’s downstream costs 
];[ cccRD ∈  under vertical access and vertical separation models, when inter-rival competition 
is weak. Specifically, if cc −>Δ , the two players – the VIP affiliate and the first efficient 
rival – will share the market and charge its’ customers the price equal to marginal costs of the 
second efficient rival. It is noteworthy that scope economy never passes on to consumers in 
the form of lower price. Intuitively, since the cost advantage of the most efficient rival over 
other potential entrant is large, the latter will not enter the market. Moreover, it will make the 
two other players (that proved to be more cost efficient) feel quite comfortable by using the 
second efficient rival’s costs as a ceiling for their prices. So, if the aggregate production 
capacity of the two players that share the market is enough to meet the total demand, there 
will be only moderate price competition between them. In such a case from the consumers’ 
point of view the vertical access model (Scheme #3) is dominated by the vertical separation 
model (Scheme #4) since the latter guarantees lower price for each realization of 
R
Dc  over its 
support.  
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Figure 3:  Equilibrium price with no inter-rival competition downstream ( cc −>Δ  ) 
 The situation with very intense inter-rival competition is illustrated by Figure 4. When rivals’ 
costs are quite similar (Δ  is small enough to satisfy Δ−< IDccˆ  or uID csaecc −++=−<Δ ˆ ) 
the vertical access model guarantees the lower price comparing to vertical separation model 
since it allows the scope economies to be passed on the consumers. The tougher is inter-rival 
competition ( 0→Δ ) the greater becomes the shaded area implying the greater attractiveness 
of the vertical access model. The result holds even if the access charge a  is set in accordance 
with the marginal cost pricing principle, uca = . This is exactly what Proposition 1 tells us 
about. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of the paper was to contribute to the discussion of pros and cons of the 
vertical separation in the context of Russian railway passenger sector reform. The possibility 
of vertical divestiture of the RZD (in the form of privatization of the Federal Passenger 
Company) has to be considered together with the assessment of downstream market 
contestability. In the context of reform strategy Proposition 1 would imply that in the 
presence of tough competition in the downstream market supplied by (or contested by) the 
unregulated RZD’s subsidiary (Federal Passenger Directorate) the vertical divestiture of the 
latter should not be considered as a necessary precondition to guarantee higher welfare gains. 
In terms of reform measures this result may have the following possible interpretation: the 
RZD’s strategy to postpone the creation of the Federal Passenger Company as an 
institutionally more separate (but still wholly owned) entity is worth considering together with 
an estimation of toughness of the downstream competition and this market contestability. 
 
The finding postulated in Proposition 2 is quite intuitive and has a direct policy implication 
for the railway reform in Russia: if antimonopoly authorities can not effectively guarantee the 
non-discriminatory activity of the vertically integrated producer (RZD in our case), meaning 
that maximum level of sabotage is high, it’s better to divest RZD and establish Federal 
Passenger Company as a separate and independent from RZD business unit. 
 
One should be very cautious when interpreting our findings since the only welfare measure 
we used in the model was the consumer’s surplus. More detailed analysis based on the total 
surplus estimation (weighted sum of consumer’s and producer’s surpluses) awaits further 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of lemma 1 
When the rival operator is more efficient then the VIP the profit of the latter will be: 
)()1)(( eccPca IDuu
I +−−+−−= ααπ .  
When VIP is more efficient the market will be served firstly by the VIP.  The price will equal 
to the marginal costs of the rival yielding the profit of 
)()1)(( eccscaca IDu
R
Du
I +−−+++−−= ααπ .  
Clearly, there is a positive relationship between sabotage and VIP’s profit: the higher is the 
sabotage the higher is the profit level ⇒  it is optimal to exercise the maximum level of 
sabotage s . 
 
Proof of lemma 2 
When the VIP has the lowest costs in the industry is the first to serve the market. 
1. eccscasca IDu
R
D
R
D −+≥++≥+Δ++ [ ]cccRD ,ˆ∈⇒  
The most efficient firm follows the VIP. Under Scheme #3 they both are free in setting their 
prices, so they will set it at the level of marginal costs of the second efficient firm 
sca RD +Δ++ . 
2. scaeccsca RD
I
Du
R
D ++>−+≥+Δ++ [ )ccc RD ˆ,ˆ Δ−∈⇒  
Both the VIP and the first efficient firm will operate at a price sca RD +Δ++ . The difference 
is that operator will now be the first who serves the market. 
3. scascaecc RD
R
D
I
Du ++>+Δ++≥−+ [ )Δ−∈⇒ ccc RD ˆ,  
The VIP won’t operate at all. Operators will raise the price up to the marginal costs of the VIP 
in order to gain more profit. The price will be equal to  ecc IDu −+  
Thus, the equilibrium prices in the market will be as stated in Lemma 2 in the text. 
 
Proof of lemma 3 
It is evident that under vertical separation s=0, since sabotage never increases equilibrium 
sales and therefore it never increases incumbent’s profit. 
 
Proof of lemma 4 
Under vertical separation marginal costs of the firms will be different: 
I
Dca +      - the former VIP’s marginal costs. There are several differences with the ones under 
integration: first of all, there are no economies of scope e and, second, the unit price on the 
downstream market is now the same for all firms and is equal to: 
R
Dca +          - marginal costs of the first efficient firm; 
Δ++ RDca   - marginal costs of the second efficient firm. 
 
Three cases are possible: 
 
1. ID
R
D
R
D cacaca +≥+≥Δ++ [ ]ccc IDRD ,∈⇒  
The former VIP has the lowest costs and will be the first to serve the market. The most 
efficient rival will follow the VIP. They both are free in setting the price, so they will set it at 
the level of marginal costs of the second efficient firm Δ++ RDca . 
2. RD
I
D
R
D cacaca +>+≥Δ++ [ )IDIDRD ccc ,Δ−∈⇒  
Both the former VIP and the least-cost rival operator will serve the market at price 
Δ++ RDca . The competitor now serves the market first. 
3. RD
R
D
I
D cacaeca +>Δ++≥−+ [ )Δ−∈⇒ IDRD ccc ,  
The former VIP will not operate at all. Independent operators will raise the price up to VIP’s 
downstream marginal costs in order to gain more profit. The price will be equal to IDca + . 
Thus, the equilibrium prices in the market will be: 
[ ][ )[ ) IDIDIDRD
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Proof of proposition 1 
Expected consumer surplus under vertical separation (Scheme #4) is: 
∫∫
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∫∫∫
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   (2) 
Expected consumer surplus under vertical access without regulation (Scheme #3) is: 
∫∫∫
∫∫
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     (3) 
Applying (2) and (3) we can find the difference between the two surpluses: 
)]ˆ()[(
)]ˆ()[()]ˆ()[()]ˆ()[(
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Now we can find the increment of the difference when Δ  changes. This is the partial 
derivative of 34−D  with respect to Δ : 
)]ˆ()[()1)](ˆ()[(34 Δ−−++=−Δ−−−−=Δ
− cfcesacfsaec
d
dD
uu  
0)]ˆ([ >Δ−cf ; uca ≥ , since the incumbent supplier cannot sell the product to the retailers on 
the upstream market at the lower price then he has to pay himself. Therefore, 034 >Δ
−
d
dD . 
Proof of proposition 2 
Using the expression for 34−D  and differentiating it with respect to s  we get: 
)]ˆ()[()ˆ(1)1)](ˆ()[()ˆ(134 Δ−−+++Δ−−=−Δ−−−−+Δ−−=− cfcsaecFcfsaeccF
sd
dD
uu . 
0)ˆ(1 >Δ−− cF  and 0>−++ ucsae 034 >⇒ −sd
dD
. 
One may also look at the effect of scale economies and differentiate 34−D  with respect to 
economies of scope e : 
)]ˆ()[()ˆ()1)](ˆ()[()ˆ(34 Δ−−+++Δ−−=−Δ−−−−+Δ−−=− cfcsaecFcfsaeccF
de
dD
uu  
The sign is ambiguous, though when [ ]⇒∈Δ− 1,0)ˆ(cF  is sufficiently small comparing with 
)]ˆ()[( Δ−−++ cfcsae u , 034 >−de
dD . 
REFERENCES 
Beard, T. R., Kaserman, D.L. and Mayo, J.W. (2001). Regulation, Vertical Integration, and 
Sabotage. J. Ind. Econ., 49, 319-333. 
Crew, M. A., Kleindorfer, P. R. and Sumpter, J. (2005). Bringing Competition to 
Telecommunications by Divesting the RBOCs. In Obtaining the Best from Regulation 
and Competition, edited by Crew, M. A., Spiegel, M., Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Dementiev, A.V. and  Doronkin, V.A. (2001). Natural Monopolies and Railway Reform. 
Russia on Russia, 6, 43-53. 
Dementiev, A.V. (2007). Reforming Russian Railways: Introduction of Competition and New 
Regulatory Challenges. In: Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport 
(J.M. Viegas, and D.A. Hensher, ed.), 707-736. Elsevier, Oxford. 
Economides, N.S. (1998). The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input 
Monopolist. Int. J. Ind. Organ., 16(May). 271-284. 
Kondaurova, I.V. and Weisman, D.L. (2003). Incentives for Non-Price Discrimination. Info. 
Econ. Pol., 15, 147-171. 
Ksoll, M. (2004). Integration of Infrastructure and Transport: an Assessment from Industrial 
Economics and Railway Perspectives, Parer presented at the 2nd Conference on Railroad 
Industry Structure, Competition and Investment, Evanston, IL, USA, October.  
Mandy, D. M. and Sappington, D.E.M. (2007). Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically-Related 
Industries. J. Regul. Econ., 31, 235-260. 
Nash C. (2007). Reform of European Passenger Railways – Where Do We Stand? In: 
Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport (J.M. Viegas, and D.A. 
Hensher, ed.), 95-114. Elsevier, Oxford. 
Pittman, R.W. (2003a). Vertical restructuring (or not) of the infrastructure sectors of transition 
economies. J. Ind. Compet. Trade, 3, 5–26. 
Pittman, R.W. (2003b). Reform in the rail and electricity sectors in Russia: restructuring, 
competition and the Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy. Acta Oecon., 53, 339–362. 
Pittman, R.W. (2004). Russian Railways Reform and non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure. Ann. Public Coop. Econ., 75:2, 167–192. 
Pittman, R.W. (2005). Structural Separation to Create Competition? The Case of Freight 
Railways. Rev. Net. Econ.4, 181-196. 
OECD. (2004). Regulatory Reform of Railways in Russia. ECMT, OECD Publications. 
OECD. (2007 update). Regulatory Reform of Railways in Russia. ECMT, OECD 
Publications, Web Release. 
Sappington, D.E.M. (2006a). On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture. Rev. Ind. Organ., 29, 171-
191. 
Sappington, D.E.M. (2006b). Regulation in Vertically-Related Industries: Myths, Facts, and 
Policy. Rev. Ind. Organ., 28, 3–16. 
Seabright, P. (2003). The Economics of Passenger Rail Transport – a Survey. IDEI Report #1 
on Passenger Rail Transport. 
Sibley, D.S. and Weisman, D.L. (1998). Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Entry of an Upstream 
Monopolist into Downstream Markets. Info. Econ. Pol., 10, 451-470. 
Weisman, D.L. (1995). Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC 
Entry into InterLATA Long Distance. J. Regul. Econ., 8, 249-266. 
Yakunin, V.I. (2007). Investment will Underpin RZD Reforms. Railway Gazette Int., 01, Jan. 
